| apt-secure(8) - phpMan
APT-SECURE(8) APT APT-SECURE(8)
NAME
apt-secure - Archive authentication support for APT
DESCRIPTION
Starting with version 0.6, apt contains code that does signature checking of the Release
file for all archives. This ensures that packages in the archive can't be modified by
people who have no access to the Release file signing key.
If a package comes from a archive without a signature, or with a signature that apt does
not have a key for, that package is considered untrusted, and installing it will result in
a big warning. apt-get will currently only warn for unsigned archives; future releases
might force all sources to be verified before downloading packages from them.
The package frontends apt-get(8), aptitude(8) and synaptic(8) support this new
authentication feature.
TRUSTED ARCHIVES
The chain of trust from an apt archive to the end user is made up of several steps.
apt-secure is the last step in this chain; trusting an archive does not mean that you
trust its packages not to contain malicious code, but means that you trust the archive
maintainer. It's the archive maintainer's responsibility to ensure that the archive's
integrity is preserved.
apt-secure does not review signatures at a package level. If you require tools to do this
you should look at debsig-verify and debsign (provided in the debsig-verify and devscripts
packages respectively).
The chain of trust in Debian starts when a maintainer uploads a new package or a new
version of a package to the Debian archive. In order to become effective, this upload
needs to be signed by a key contained in the Debian Maintainers keyring (available in the
debian-keyring package). Maintainers' keys are signed by other maintainers following
pre-established procedures to ensure the identity of the key holder.
Once the uploaded package is verified and included in the archive, the maintainer
signature is stripped off, and checksums of the package are computed and put in the
Packages file. The checksums of all of the Packages files are then computed and put into
the Release file. The Release file is then signed by the archive key for this Debian
release, and distributed alongside the packages and the Packages files on Debian mirrors.
The keys are in the Debian archive keyring available in the debian-archive-keyring
package.
End users can check the signature of the Release file, extract a checksum of a package
from it and compare it with the checksum of the package they downloaded by hand - or rely
on APT doing this automatically.
Notice that this is distinct from checking signatures on a per package basis. It is
designed to prevent two possible attacks:
· Network "man in the middle" attacks. Without signature checking, malicious agents can
introduce themselves into the package download process and provide malicious software
either by controlling a network element (router, switch, etc.) or by redirecting
traffic to a rogue server (through ARP or DNS spoofing attacks).
· Mirror network compromise. Without signature checking, a malicious agent can
compromise a mirror host and modify the files in it to propagate malicious software to
all users downloading packages from that host.
However, it does not defend against a compromise of the Debian master server itself (which
signs the packages) or against a compromise of the key used to sign the Release files. In
any case, this mechanism can complement a per-package signature.
USER CONFIGURATION
apt-key is the program that manages the list of keys used by apt. It can be used to add or
remove keys, although an installation of this release will automatically contain the
default Debian archive signing keys used in the Debian package repositories.
In order to add a new key you need to first download it (you should make sure you are
using a trusted communication channel when retrieving it), add it with apt-key and then
run apt-get update so that apt can download and verify the InRelease or Release.gpg files
from the archives you have configured.
ARCHIVE CONFIGURATION
If you want to provide archive signatures in an archive under your maintenance you have
to:
· Create a toplevel Release file, if it does not exist already. You can do this by
running apt-ftparchive release (provided in apt-utils).
· Sign it. You can do this by running gpg --clearsign -o InRelease Release and gpg -abs
-o Release.gpg Release.
· Publish the key fingerprint, that way your users will know what key they need to
import in order to authenticate the files in the archive.
Whenever the contents of the archive change (new packages are added or removed) the
archive maintainer has to follow the first two steps outlined above.
SEE ALSO
apt.conf(5), apt-get(8), sources.list(5), apt-key(8), apt-ftparchive(1), debsign(1),
debsig-verify(1), gpg(1)
For more background information you might want to review the Debian Security
Infrastructure[1] chapter of the Securing Debian Manual (available also in the harden-doc
package) and the Strong Distribution HOWTO[2] by V. Alex Brennen.
BUGS
APT bug page[3]. If you wish to report a bug in APT, please see
/usr/share/doc/debian/bug-reporting.txt or the reportbug(1) command.
AUTHOR
APT was written by the APT team <apt AT packages.org>.
MANPAGE AUTHORS
This man-page is based on the work of Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña, Isaac Jones, Colin
Walters, Florian Weimer and Michael Vogt.
AUTHORS
Jason Gunthorpe
APT team
NOTES
1. Debian Security Infrastructure
http://www.debian.org/doc/manuals/securing-debian-howto/ch7
2. Strong Distribution HOWTO
http://www.cryptnet.net/fdp/crypto/strong_distro.html
3. APT bug page
http://bugs.debian.org/src:apt
APT 1.0.9.8.4 09 June 2012 APT-SECURE(8)
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